International Collaborations

Several export control requirements are applicable when collaborating with potential research partners:

1. When drafting or planning to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with a potential non-US research partner that does not directly fall under the auspices of URA, the faculty member planning to enter into such an Agreement must alert the Export Control Administrator so that any export control implications to the proposed Agreement can be evaluated in advance
2. Prior to signing such an Agreement, UChicago shall screen such entity and signatories against the U.S. Government’s watch lists to ensure that potential partners are not listed.
3. MOUs or MOAs may contemplate the exchange of export controlled items or data that drive the collaborative research. Because the export of such items or their receipt into UChicago’s laboratories potentially has export control implications, these implications must be identified at the earliest opportunity so that the parties can plan accordingly. In certain cases, where the research is predicated on the receipt of (or access to) an export controlled item that requires prior government approval through a license or authorization, it is important that the parties take this contingency into account either in the MOU/MOA process or in a subsequent writing. UChicago cannot bind itself to a contractual obligation without acknowledging the need to fulfill a regulatory condition without which the program cannot proceed as intended.
4. Subsequent amendments to the MOU/MOA must proceed according to the same evaluation process, to the extent they subsequently alter the terms of the initial MOU/MOA or where the parties/signatories change over time.
5. When the MOU/MOA contemplates concurrent or subsequent Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) and/or the receipt of export controlled items or data, contact URA to determine the precise export control language that shall be inserted into the NDA. The purpose of this language will be to alert Chicago in advance of a party’s intention to provide export controlled items, so that Chicago can determine the correct handling and disposition of such items consistent with control requirements or, where appropriate, decline acceptance of these items.

URA is responsible for determining whether an agreement, award or contract contains or triggers export control restrictions. In general, UChicago does not accept restrictions in its awards or contracts that would restrict UChicago faculty members, students and administrators who are not U.S. persons from access to research and research results which would otherwise remain unrestricted under the Fundamental Research Exclusion (FRE). However, exception to this policy may occur, requiring export control analysis. For example, ITAR content or tools associated with fundamental research trigger certain access restrictions. International collaborative research may also trigger limitations to the FRE.

Further, in certain cases, a sponsor’s intention with regard to export controls or the control implication of a particular clause or set of clauses may be ambiguous as to Chicago’s export control responsibilities. For example, this may occur with respect to “flow down” restrictions in a subcontract, or vague or open-ended publication and/or citizenship limitations. In this case, where such ambiguities arise or assistance is required in negotiating out a particular clause, it is incumbent upon URA to resolve the matter prior to committing to the obligation or accepting its financial benefits. For any questions concerning applicable export controls under a particular agreement of contract, please contact URA.

Because the transfer of technology and/or materials pursuant to a Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) may trigger export control requirements, URA’s Contracting team shall work directly with the Export Control Office to proactively identify and resolve export control requirements associated with an MTA. Such requirements may be triggered when the activity contemplates an  international transfer or is domestic within the U.S., but UChicago has knowledge that the item will be re-exported by the receiving party.

As applicable to the transaction at hand, the Material Transfer Agreement shall take into account necessary export control provisions that include but are not limited to notification of export control status (ITAR or EAR) as well as general end use/user restrictions and applicable destination control statements.

Note that incoming NDA’s (where UChicago is requested to sign another party’s confidentiality agreement covering the receipt of proprietary items or data) must likewise be reviewed and provisioned for export control purposes. As the potential modification of another party’s Confidentiality Agreement can take additional time, URA’s Contracting team shall be alerted as soon as possible to a pending Agreement so as to allow sufficient opportunity for timely

Contacts updated: September 22, 2022

The University of Chicago Center in Beijing was established to provide a variety of services in China in support of the academic mission of the University of Chicago. The services the Center in Beijing may provide on behalf of the University of Chicago include facilitating the research activities of University faculty and students in China and hosting or providing space for conferences, workshops, colloquia and other educational activities that will be attended by University faculty, students and staff.

The presence of the Center in Beijing will spur research collaborations and other interactions between University faculty, students and staff and Chinese nationals, corporations and academic institutions (as well as nationals, corporations and academic institutions of other countries). However, export controls may be implicated when members of the University community transfer commodities, software, technology or services to China. Such transfers or exports can occur not only when University members in the United States communicate with their Chinese counterparts, but when University members travel to China for meetings and discussions. Export control laws and regulations govern the movement of certain commodities, software, technology and services to foreign countries, as well as the transfer of certain technology and services to foreign nationals (wherever located). The consequences of failing to comply with export control laws can be severe. Violations of U.S. export control laws could result in fines for criminal violations of up to $1,000,000 per transaction and prison sentences of up to twenty years.

The following identifies and provides guidance on certain export control issues that may arise from University research activities and other interactions in China that the Center in Beijing will foster. Additional guidance on export controls and travel to China is available from University Research Administration and the Office of Legal Counsel. Such assistance should be sought well in advance of any departure from the United States for travel to China.

The principal contacts at the University concerning export controls are Aaron DeLee (Export Control Officer), who can be reached at (773) 834-7956 and aarondelee@uchicago.edu, and Smita Singh (Assistant General Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel), who can be reached at (773) 702-7237 and smitasingh@uchicago.edu. Additional guidance about export controls can also be found on the website of University Research Administration:

https://ura.uchicago.edu/page/export-compliance-overview-1

1. Technology Transfer/Research Collaboration

• Technology transfer to China and research collaboration between U.S. and Chinese persons or entities may be restricted under U.S. export control laws, depending on the nature and end use of the technology, as set forth below. Most research conducted by U.S. universities involving foreign persons is permitted under the fundamental research exception, as discussed in more detail below.
• Under the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) administered by the State Department, the transfer to China of any items, technology or services designated as defense- related by the U.S. government, including commercial items modified or enhanced for military application, is prohibited under an arms embargo against China.
• Under the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR) administered by the Commerce Department, the transfer of certain items (such as computers and GPS equipment) that have  both a commercial and potential military application (“dual-use items”) to China, including those controlled for national security reasons, requires an export license from the Commerce Department.
• Under the U.S. Department of Energy’s Part 810 Regulations, the transfer to China of technology, services and software related to nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel-cycle facilities, related parts and components, and certain nuclear materials requires prior specific authorization.
• Fundamental research conducted at a university in the United States and subsequently transferred to China generally is exempt from export licensing requirements if it meets the specific requirements in the applicable regulations.
• Fundamental research includes basic or applied research in science or engineering at an accredited institution of higher learning in the United States where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly in the scientific community.
• Fundamental research is distinguished from research that results in information that is restricted for proprietary reasons or pursuant to specific U.S. government access and dissemination controls.
• Fundamental research conducted outside the United States regarding EAR subject matter should be reviewed to confirm whether it is exempt from export control requirements under EAR’s Fundamental Research Exclusion.
• For research with Chinese persons or entities covered under EAR’s Fundamental Research Exclusion (i.e. with the intention to publish research results), the instruments or technical data developed as the result of such research (regardless of whether the items or data were developed in Chicago or in China) will not be subject to export controls that restrict foreign national access to such instruments or data. However, where a PI accepts proprietary “background” data from a sponsor or collaborator that is required to conduct the research (typically through a non-disclosure agreement) and this data is export controlled, access to this data may trigger a foreign national access control depending on the type of data and nationality of the person accessing or planning to access it.
  
  When data is provided from a U.S. sponsor or collaborator in the U.S., the sponsor or collaborator typically notifies the recipient if the data is export controlled. When data is provided from a Chinese sponsor or collaborator in China, the data may not be identified as export controlled. In this scenario, when data is provided within China and remains there, no U.S. export control considerations arise. However, if the data is transferred back to the U.S. by any means (e.g., brought back to the U.S. by the PI, or emailed to the U.S. by the Chinese sponsor or collaborator), U.S. export controls may attach depending on the content and sensitivity of the data. If export controls apply, this will mean that it may be necessary to obtain a license to ultimately export that data back to China or elsewhere internationally for further use.

• There is no exemption for fundamental research conducted outside the United States regarding ITAR-controlled subject matter.

• To the extent University of Chicago personnel intend to export or re-export equipment, materials, software or other items to China, such shipments may require prior authorization from the U.S. and other governments depending on the nature of the export controls on the items at issue (e.g., items controlled for national security, missile technology, and chemical/biological weapons reasons require export licenses for China).
• While University of Chicago personnel may travel to China with standard laptops with commercial, mass-market software (e.g., Windows software), certain non mass-market or customized encryption software or hardware may not be exported or transferred to China without prior review or authorization by the Commerce Department.

• Prior authorization may be required before conducting activities with certain prohibited persons and entities on the U.S. Government Restricted Parties Lists, including the U.S. Commerce Department’s Entity List, Denied Parties List, and Unverified List, the Treasury Department List of Specially Designated Nationals, and the State Department’s List of Statutorily Debarred Parties and list of foreign entities subject to nonproliferation sanctions. Chinese entities can be restricted or prohibited. For the consolidated list, see http://www.export.gov/ecr/eg_main_023148.asp.
• The Entity List includes foreign companies, organizations, and individuals designated by the U.S. Government as engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, diversion of export-controlled items, or activities contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. Certain entities in China are included on the Entity List.  The following is a selected list  of such entities:

• China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT);
• Beijing Institute of Structure and Environmental Engineering (BISE);
• Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA);
• Northwestern Polytechnical University;
• Southwest Research Institute of Electronics Technology.

• The University of Chicago is restricted from participating in any activities in China involving:
  • Uranium enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water production;
  • Nuclear facilities in China not subject to international safeguards;
  • Nuclear explosives or weapons;
  • Chemical and biological weapons; and
  • Missile delivery systems.

While China is not subject to comprehensive economic sanctions administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), OFAC does maintain a list of individuals and entities that are involved in proliferation, terrorist, narco-trafficking, and other illicit activities. This Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List includes certain Chinese individuals or entities, and any financial transactions with such individuals or entities are prohibited (including making payments to or receiving payments from such individuals or entities).

China also maintains export and import restrictions on sensitive technology and items. For instance, certain dual use, defense and nuclear items are subject to Chinese export controls. In addition, the import of certain encryption items into China is subject to prior review and/or authorization.

• I visit China for purposes of collaborating with an institution or researcher there on fundamental research.

Make sure that none of the background information being shared with the Chinese institution or PI to launch the research is itself export controlled under the EAR, ITAR or DOE regulations; make sure that we have screened such recipients against the Government’s denied/restricted party lists.

• I visit China for purposes of procuring research instruments.

Make sure that you do not provide any technical data (written or oral specifications or requirements) that is prohibited under the ITAR or under the EAR or DOE regulations without prior authorization.

• I plan to bring my laptop with me to China.

You can do so, but it cannot contain any ITAR-governed technical data or proprietary information otherwise controlled under the EAR or DOE regulations, even if you do not intend to share it with anyone.

• What if my laptop contains controlled information?

Remove the controlled data or inquire about the possibility of obtaining a clean laptop for your trip.

• I visit China to give a presentation concerning research findings or attend a conference.

Make sure you confine your comments to research findings, and do not offer “off-podium” advice or services on specific instrument operation or implementation that departs from published fundamental research.

• I generate a proposal to a Chinese institution.

Make sure the proposal is reviewed for export controlled content and denied/restricted entity screening prior to submission.

• I receive proprietary background data from a sponsor in China that I intend to transfer back to the U.S.

Determine whether or not export controls apply to a) foreign nationals accessing the data in the U.S., or b) eventually re-exporting it out of the U.S.

• I want to export an item (research instrument or resulting product) from the U.S. to China.

Determine whether the item is controlled for China and, if so, whether a license is required prior to transfer.

• There is a change in my collaborating research institution or the content of my collaboration agreement.

Timely provide information to our Export Control Office to screen for potential end use/user restrictions.

Contacts updated: July 14, 2022

As you may have seen in recent headlines, certain countries such as China, Russia and Saudi Arabia, have been the focus of targeted US sanctions. These sanctions have resulted in individuals and entities from these countries being newly deemed as “Specially Designated Nationals”, meaning that U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.

These recent developments, and the potential for further congressional and/or executive action in areas of US sanctions and Export Control reforms, should serve as a reminder to us all that the University’s long-term ability to engage broadly and openly with potential donors, scholars and collaborators here and around the world depends upon our awareness and consideration of these regulatory issues. While these regulations apply directly to University activities, they also apply to individuals’ outside activities (e.g., serving on an advisory committee or consulting) and federal funding agencies expect compliance with these matters in both university and outside relationships.

To that end, I write to encourage your administrators and faculty to conduct appropriate diligence on individuals and organizations with whom they are engaging, both on campus and abroad. The University has specific resources to support these screening and diligence efforts, which are listed below:

1. For potential donors: David W. Cashman, Senior Director, International Advancement (cashman@uchicago.edu; 773-702-5113)
2. For potential research collaborations or sponsors: Export Control team at exportcontrol@lists.uchicago.edu.
3. All other relationships: Katie Hrinyak, Executive Director, Operations and Strategy (khrinyak@uchicago.edu; 773-834-1559)

Similarly, if your faculty or staff are contemplating any research or transactional activity within or involving an OFAC-sanctioned country (as described below), please contact the Export Control team at exportcontrol@lists.uchicago.edu and Smita Singh, Assistant General Counsel (smitasingh@uchicago.edu; 773-702-7239) for assistance before proceeding.

Additional background information on US Sanctions Programs and Specially Designated Nationals is below. If your unit would like to receive further information and/or trainings on these topics and related obligations, please contact exportcontrol@lists.uchicago.edu.

Additional Background

US Sanctions Programs: The Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) administers US sanctions programs which involve the blocking of assets and trade restrictions to accomplish foreign policy and national security goals. These US sanctions programs vary in scope;

some are broad-based and geographically oriented (i.e. Cuba, Iran) while others are “targeted” towards certain policy goals (e.g., counter-terrorism, human rights violations, election interference, counter-narcotics) and focus on specific individuals and entities. OFAC maintains a list of these sanction programs here.

Specially Designated Nationals:  OFAC maintains a list of individuals and entities that are the target of   a US sanction program (known as the “Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list” or   “SDN List”), which includes approximately 6,400 names of individuals and organizations, including foreign universities, who are connected with the sanctions targets. U.S. persons are prohibited from dealing with SDNs wherever they are located and all SDN assets are blocked. Importantly, entities that are 50% owned (directly or indirectly) by an individual on the SDN List are also blocked, regardless of whether that entity is separately named on the SDN List. The University utilizes a tool called “Visual Compliance” to screen named individuals and companies against the SDN and similar lists. The following administrative units have access to this tool: ARD,  Global,  URA,  and Procurement  and Shared Services within central F&A.

Penalties for Non-Compliance: Penalties for violating US sanctions apply to individuals and corporations and vary depending on the underlying sanctions program. For example, violations can result in criminal penalties of up to $1 million per violation for corporations and $250,000 or up to twenty years in prison (or both) per violation for individuals. Civil penalty maximums can range from approximately $78,000 to over $1 million per violation.

Daniel Diermeier
Provost | University of Chicago

For more than a century, University faculty, other academic appointees, postdocs, and students have engaged with scholars from around the world. International collaborations continue to enhance our eminence in research and education both here and around the world.    

While we pursue this fundamental commitment to international engagement, there are growing concerns from Congress, the Department of Justice, National Institutes of Health (NIH), and other federal agencies that international collaborations involving US universities are being used to improperly access advanced technologies and IP, especially those with strategic economic and military applications in foreign countries. By way of example, Dr. Francis Collins, Director of NIH, described the following risks in a letter to NIH grantee institutions:

• Diversion of intellectual property (IP) in grant application or produced by NIH-supported biomedical research to other entities, including other countries;
• Sharing of confidential information on grant applications by NIH peer reviewers with others, including foreign entities, or otherwise attempting to influence funding decisions; and
• Failure by some researchers working at NIH-funded institutions in the U.S. to disclose substantial resources from other organizations, including foreign governments, which threatens to distort decisions about the appropriate use of NIH funds

As a result, Dr. Collins formed a Working Group for Foreign Influences on Research Integrity, which issued a report on these issues (available here) that includes recommendations for NIH and grantees to consider. Similar initiatives and reports have been issued by the Department of Justice and outside groups such as the Association of American Universities. I want to emphasize that there are no new major statutory or regulatory requirements at this time; however, the increased federal scrutiny of these international collaborations warrants attention. Also, as this is an evolving landscape, federal policy changes may be an inevitable outcome. We will continue to monitor and provide updates as they become available.

In furtherance of the University’s commitment to supporting international activities, research collaborations, and educational programs, there are many resources in place to ensure that both institutional and individual interests are protected. The following are some of these resources along with recommended actions to ensure protection:

• Disclose external financial interests and conflicts of commitment annually and as new financial interests arise.
• Disclose other support and non-U.S. performance sites during the proposal submission and in subsequent progress reports as required by external sponsors.
• Ensure your institutional and individuals collaborators are not on any “Specially Designated Nationals” or sanction lists and otherwise comply with export control regulations when sending tangible items, data, and software to foreign collaborators.
• Work with the UChicago Global Office to establish MOUs/partnership agreements with international organizations.
• Process proposals, awards, data use agreements, material transfer agreements and other research-related agreements with external organizations through University Research Administration (URA).
• Disclose new inventions, funding sources and all inventors who contribute to the creation of a new innovation to Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation.

Thank you for the continued diligence in following these regulations, institutional processes, and sponsor requirements. Our collective attention to these matters is vital to the long-term stewardship of our research enterprise and ensuring our international collaborations and research continue to have maximum impact around the world.

Daniel Diermeier
Provost | University of Chicago

In response to the Russian Federation’s (Russia’s) invasion of Ukraine, and to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, the U.S. government has taken several significant actions that may impact activities at the University of Chicago. We encourage all members of our community to review the latest restrictions (below) and contact the Export Controls Office (ECO) at exportcontrol@lists.uchicago.edu if you are planning to travel to these countries, or if you have intentions to conduct research, collaborate, or otherwise transact with individuals or organizations related to Russia, Belarus, and sanctioned regions of the Ukraine.

The latest Export Control and Sanctions-related restrictions are described below:

Export Control Restrictions:

• The Department of Commerce, through the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), has issued a rule further restricting access to inputs and products needed to sustain Russian military capabilities. The exporting of any item on the Commerce Control List (CCL), by shipment or by carry-on baggage, will require a license through BIS. There are limited exceptions for some items that are classified as EAR99. Additionally, and consistent with this expanded license requirement, the restrictions revise the foreign ‘‘direct product’’ rule (FDP rule) such that foreign-produced items derived from ECCNs in Categories 0 through 9 of the CCL will now be subject to the EAR under the Russia/Belarus FDP rule as well as to the license requirement.
• The Department of Commerce has also imposed restrictions on the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or within Russia or Belarus of `luxury goods', and for exports, reexports and transfers (in-country) worldwide to certain Russian or Belarusian oligarchs and other malign actors supporting the Russian or Belarusian governments. Taken together, these new export controls will significantly limit financially elite individuals' and organizations' access to luxury goods and thereby accentuate the consequences of providing such support.

OFAC Prohibited Transactions / Sanctioned Entities: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed numerous financial and trade sanctions implicating Russia and Belarus: 

• Most notable, is a sanction that prohibits the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of U.S. dollar-denominated banknotes (currency) to the Government of the Russian Federation or any person located in the Russian Federation.
• Other OFAC sanctions include:
  • Blocking Russia’s Financial Institutions, including global subsidiaries
  • Prohibiting Individuals, such as families close to Putin and Financial Sector Elites

OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) is continuously being updated with entities and individuals. All property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of these persons are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.

The above listing is not comprehensive, and the situation is continuously evolving. We ask that University of Chicago faculty and staff be cautious with any interactions involving Russia, Belarus, and sanctioned regions of the Ukraine; especially when dealing with material transfers, or financial transactions (including U.S. currency).  The sanctions are widespread, and the penalties are severe. To further assist our community, the University of Chicago offers the following resources:

Compliance Contacts: To assist, The University has specific resources to support international activities and compliance:

1. For potential Donors: David W. Cashman, Senior Director, International Advancement (cashman@uchicago.edu; 773-702-5113)
2. For potential Research Collaborations or sponsors: URA Export Control Office at exportcontrol@lists.uchicago.edu.
3. All other relationships: Katie Hrinyak, Executive Director, Operations and Strategy (khrinyak@uchicago.edu; 773-834-1559)

If you currently have or anticipate having any of the following activities with these parties or any other heavily sanctioned/embargoed countries, you are encouraged to contact the appropriate University resource as soon as possible:   

• Collaborations on research or other projects
• Physical shipments (export and import)
• Technology exchanges and electronic transmissions
• Travel
• Financial transactions and dealings

The above listing is not meant to be exhaustive. University staff, faculty, and students should reach out to the identified University resources for a review of any current or planned activity with these parties as early as possible. It is also important to remind our community that The University of Chicago does not discourage these types of collaborations or activities; rather our goal continues to be to support all of these efforts within the confines of all applicable laws, restrictions, or regulations.